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Abstract
The essay introduces the problem of aesthetic unreliability, the
variety of ways in which it is difficult to grasp our aesthetic
experience and the consequent confusion and unreliability of
what we take as our taste.
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1. Introduction

Webmaster

Aestheticians have wandered increasingly from the common
ground of aesthetic theory into the philosophies of particular
arts, such as music, film, dance, or literature. The
philosophies of the arts offer a refreshing role for
philosophers. By focusing on particular arts, philosophers
have been able to speak usefully to art historians,
musicologists, and literary critics and answer questions in their
disciplines: the nature of our comprehension of film narrative,
pictorial perception, moral education in the novel, or
composition versus performance-based standards in music, to
name only a few. As an added bonus, rubbing elbows in one
of the art worlds may also make for a less lonely existence for
aestheticians. Perhaps, too, the shift from basic questions to
particular arts reflects the belief that all is well with our
conceptions of taste and aesthetic experience. The heavy
lifting is behind us. Today the basic questions are the stuff of
undergraduate surveys rather than advanced research. My
view, however, is that aesthetics has not yet faced one the
most troubling features of aesthetic life: the very difficulty of
knowing our aesthetic experience and the consequent
confusion and unreliability of what we take as our taste.
This problem—let’s call it aesthetic unreliability—returns us to
the very foundations of aesthetics and raises questions about
the authority of individuals’ assessments of their aesthetic
experience and all that follows from those assessments.
Aesthetic unreliability requires us to reconsider the individual
as both connoisseur and consumer. It suggests alternative
explanations for some of the more curious features of cultural
life, namely, that our taste is often incoherent, the practice of
criticism largely arbitrary, and creative practices something of
a free-for-all. Aesthetic unreliability supports the view that
our inner aesthetic lives are more anarchic, protean, and

unknown than we have been willing to admit.
The stakes are high, at least by the standards of aesthetics:
whatever we make of our aesthetic lives is typically held to
depend in part on our ability to more or less accurately assess
our experience of the art that we encounter. Theories of taste
presuppose a notion of contemplation as transparent and
unproblematic: we know the nature, degree and sources of
our satisfactions as well as changes in them over time.
Without this knowledge, our aesthetic lives would be no more
than what Ted Cohen has called “a concatenation of atomistic
expressions,” lacking continuity and coherence.[1] Our very
ability to direct and enhance our aesthetic experience—quite
simply, to have an aesthetic life—is thought to be dependent
on the reliability or authenticity of aesthetic self-knowledge.
However, certain features of our aesthetic lives compel a
skeptical view of the reliability of what we identify as our taste,
aesthetic experience, or aesthetic judgment. By these I mean,
broadly, the mental states or episodes that occur when
attending to aesthetic objects like works of art, especially the
affective quality of our responses and the secondary, synthetic
process of reflecting on, recalling, comparing, and ordering
these experiences. I submit that, often enough, we suppress
or exaggerate our responses to the point of self-deception.
We have difficulty in identifying what in an object causes our
response to it. The instability of our feelings over time is such
that we are unsure if our responses are caused by our mood,
factors in our environment, or the object to which we are
attending. The unreliability of aesthetic responses is, for
aestheticians, the long unacknowledged Cartesian ball of wax,
yet to be warmed in the palm.
Aestheticians have long assumed the authenticity of aesthetic
experience while focusing instead on its objectivity. Since the
establishment of the discipline of aesthetics in the eighteenth
century, conflicts of taste between individuals have been
among the discipline’s most intractable and popular problems.
The resolution of the problem has been thought to be essential
to an adequate aesthetic theory. Some of the most commonly
considered notions in philosophical aesthetics, for example,
Hume’s standard of taste and Kant’s sensus communis, arose
in part as answers to this problem. Similarly, the most familiar
folk maxims concerning taste, such as “To each, his own” or
“One man’s treasure is another man’s trash,” are essentially
rules of thumb for contending with conflicts of taste. By
contrast, one familiar saying touching on aesthetic unreliability
simply dismisses it: “I do not know anything about art but I
know what I like.”
It is easy to see why conflicts of taste have attracted more
attention than aesthetic unreliability. Conflicts of taste are
easily observed. The friction of cultural differences like race,
class, and gender is manifest in them. In a back-handed way,
conflicts of taste remind us that culture matters and, in the
right measure, we relish this reminder. Disagreements over
taste reach the heart of aesthetics: the objectivity of aesthetic
judgments, the catholicity of aesthetic experience, and the
very possibility of good and bad taste. Through such conflicts,
we confront and learn to live with our differences.
Yet even as philosophers have wrung their hands about this

conflict between selves, they have remained oblivious of the
confusion within selves.[2] Our personal aesthetic confusion is
not so easily observed. We take our self-understanding of our
aesthetic experience and taste as self-evident. However, the
objectivity of judgments of taste is moot if we are unable to
form them with much reliability. Aesthetic unreliability is a
new problem for the discipline, requiring us to reconsider the
very cognitive and affective bases of taste. In this essay, I
want to make the case that we need to return to the question
of taste, not as a point of interpersonal conflict, but instead as
one of personal confusion. It is the difference between, on the
one hand, determining the extent of the objectivity of
aesthetic judgments and, on the other, the extent of their
authenticity. Our problem is not so much the nature of sensus
communis as the extent of sensus ignarus.
2. The Reliability of Self-Knowledge
Philosophers of mind have been reluctant to accord much
credibility to anti-reliabilist positions.[3] Arguments against
aesthetic unreliability have emphasized: 1. a non-contingent
relationship between consciousness and self-consciousness,
that is, the impossibility of being unconscious of a conscious
emotion or thought; 2. the assignment of difficulty in selfappraisal to the overall difficulty in understanding the world
itself rather than to the process of self-appraisal; and 3. a shift
in the grounds of authority from accuracy to deliberative or
agential responsibility.
1. Focusing on the problem of affective self-knowledge,
Christoph Jaeger observes that philosophers commonly accept
that when subjects are in a state of mind, they strongly
believe they are in that state of mind. It is in the nature of a
mental state that, when we are in it, we know we are in it.
This principle of self-intimation, as Jaeger calls it, is taken as
“a requirement for minimally (epistemically) rational
subjects.”[4] However, Jaeger argues that it is internally
inconsistent to admit first-person authority but reject the
possibility of agnosticism about our own feelings.[5] If we are
necessarily taken as authorities about our feelings, then
professions of ignorance about our feelings must also be
admitted. With them, the possibility of affective ignorance is
also admitted. Therefore, there is nothing logically impossible
about aesthetic unreliability
2. It is sometimes argued that skepticism about selfknowledge is a false problem generated from a Cartesian
theory of mind according to which objects are mistakenly held
to appear to the mind’s eye as “inner objects,” Davidson’s
famous “myth of the mental.”[6] However, it is important to
recognize that that we are speaking not so much about our
beliefs about objects in the world as what Victoria McGeer calls
our “cognitive and emotional situation.” What is at issue is, as
she puts it, “an agent's ability to use and understand the
conceptual repertoire of folk psychology, particularly with
regard to interpreting her experiences and, so, explaining and
justifying her own reactions to, and behavior in, the world.”[7]
By contrast, reliabilism rests only on what Jaeger calls
“positive affective introspection.” What is reliably registered is
a simple valence or state of mind, that is to say, knowledge of
whether we are happy, sad, bored or excited. One of the

staunchest defenders of reliabilism, Sydney Shoemaker,
clarifies the limits of the reliabilist position:
The knowledge I have in mind is not, as you perhaps
hoped, the difficult-to-get knowledge that arises from
successfully following the Socratic injunction "Know
thyself"; it is the humdrum kind of knowledge that is
expressed in such remarks as "It itches," "I'm hungry,"
"I don't want to," and "I'm bored.”[8]
To be sure, aesthetic responses often involve simple selfintimation. However, we typically expect a bit more of our
aesthetic assessments. And, it is here that anti-reliabilism
finds its footing. As Eric Schwitzgebel asks, “Does the
apparent difficulty in going wrong in simple judgments of color
and pain experiences in canonical conditions reflect the general
security of our judgments about our ongoing stream of
conscious experience, or are those cases exceptional, best
cases?”[9] Schwitzgebel suggests that the geography of
reliabilism may consist only in familiar albeit scattered islands
in wider seas of unreliability. Reliability is undermined not by
“humdrum” mental states but rather by complex and ongoing
consciousness. The difference between mere self-intimation of
positive affective states and authentic self-knowledge is
something like the difference between knowing one is unhappy
and knowing the nature of that unhappiness and its causes:
what does this unhappiness feel like right now? Why do I feel
it? Was I happier in the past than I am now? As many a
counselor will aver, mere positive affective intimation is rarely
sufficient to contend with unhappiness. As with our emotional
life, aesthetic life requires more of us than mere status
reports. A degree of rumination is involved. For these
experiences, we cannot dismiss skepticism about introspection
(not to mention the empirical studies which support it) as a
false problem.
3. Where philosophers have conceded introspective
unreliability, they have been reluctant to accord it much
significance. For Richard Moran, self-knowledge is
authoritative because it is the result of the deliberative
process. Although introspection may often be less than
accurate and sometimes downright self-deceptive, it remains
authoritative not because we always know our own thoughts
best but because it is up to us to know it. As Moran puts it, it
is “our business” to know: “It is not just the report that the
person is author of, but also, in a central range of cases, the
person can be seen as the author of the state of mind itself, in
the sense of the being the person responsible for it.”[10] The
deliberative process makes us responsible for our selfascriptions, even illusory ones. Fallibility has no bearing on
authority: we are responsible for the results of our own
deliberation.
However, Krista Lawlor has argued that even deliberation is
not sufficient to secure authority. Lawlor argues that “one
might be ready and able to deliberate about what one’s
attitudes should be, and successfully deliberate oneself into a
particular attitude, but one’s resulting self-ascription lacks
authority nonetheless.”[11] For, as we will see, we often
unconsciously abandon the results of deliberation in future
action. And deliberation itself can undermine accurate self-

ascription. Thus, our self-ascriptions built from deliberation
lack authority because they do not play an authoritative role in
will formation. It may well be “our business” to know our
preferences but, when it comes to complex self-ascriptions like
aesthetic preferences, what we claim to prefer has little
relation to what we do.
As an alternative, Lawlor roots authority in agency, in what we
end up doing. On this view, self-ascriptions may be
considered reliable when they are confirmed by what we do.
Lawlor is close to the consensus of social psychologists who,
as we will now see, find self-ascription most reliable when it
conforms to behavior. When it does not conform to behavior,
it is reasonable to doubt its authenticity.
3. The Paradox of Introspection
Psychological studies of consciousness have long been
hampered by what Jonathan Schooler calls the “paradox of
introspection,” namely that “experience is subjectively selfevident but empirically inscrutable.”[12] Despite the
introspective sense of certainty, it has been difficult to
empirically determine if introspective reports are accurate.
Nevertheless, individuals typically have high confidence in their
self-appraisals.
However, cognitive and social psychologists have slowly
chipped away at what Timothy Wilson calls the illusion of
authenticity.[13] In Strangers to Ourselves, Wilson
synthesizes a range of empirical research to present a general
case against self-knowledge, reinforcing the findings of his
seminal article on the issue from 1977.[14] In recent years, a
number of empirical protocols have enhanced the acceptability
of empirical research on introspection.[15] Methodologically,
researchers must rely on the “triangulation” of introspective
reports with physiological and behavioral evidence. In this
spirit, they have provided a steady diet of studies that
reinforce the plausibility of what Daniel Haybron calls affective
ignorance[16] or what John Lambie and Anthony Marcel call
emotion unawarenesss[17] or Eric Schwitzgebel introspective
fallibilism.[18] Even as they argue for the use of introspection
under rigorous methodological conditions, A.I. Jack and
Andreas Roepstorff acknowledge the discontinuities between
consciousness and introspection. They write that “patterns of
behavior, neural processes, and experience exist as distinct
facets of the mental.”[19] Jonathan Schooler has argued that
the process of introspectively representing mental content
invites the possibility of error or distortion.[20] For Schooler,
such errors are more than glitches in research programs; they
are part and parcel of everyday life, including, by implication,
aesthetic life.[21]
Schooler’s balanced approach seeks the strengths and
weaknesses of introspection under different conditions. The
main problem with introspection for Schooler is that when we
try to characterize an experience, we risk distorting it.
Schooler discusses the conditions where introspection proves
most vulnerable, and he identifies distortions in the weighting
of parts of experience (the peak/end effect), recollection with
verbalization (verbal overshadowing), and hedonic appraisal as
three situations where introspection is weakest.

4. Peak/End Effect
One of the most familiar forms of introspective illusion is the
peak/end effect. Our knowledge of prior experiences is often
distorted by biases of recollection. Schooler writes that
introspective reports “fail to fully reflect what was actually
experienced moment-by-moment (even when the episode is
brief and the introspection occurs immediately after the
experience ends).”[22] In work exploring recollections of
annoying noises and induced pain, hedonic appraisals rarely
capture the overall experience of an episode. Instead, as
Schooler puts it, “individuals’ retrospective evaluations
overemphasize the pleasure or discomfort at the episode’s
most extreme moment and at its ending, the peak and the
end. Other moments have little effect on global hedonic
assessments.”[23] Taste inevitably involves reflection and
recollection of prior experience. As we move to each
successive work of art, we produce comparisons that are
fueled by memory and introspection, recollections of work and
experiences, prior measurements. The peak/end effect
suggests that there are ways in which retrospective,
comparative assessments of works of art, crucial to taste
formation, are distorted.
5. Verbal overshadowing
Schooler acknowledges that recently recollected visual
imagery can be quite accurate. However, it is less accurate
when accompanied by a verbal overlay. In a widely replicated
study, subjects viewed pictures of faces.[24] Later, they were
asked to recall the faces, with one group verbally describing
them in detail. Researchers found that when subjects are
asked to provide verbal descriptions, they are much more
likely to misremember. The cross-over between the verbal
and the visual seems to create the cognitive difficulty. The
very process of translating non-verbal introspection into words
is disruptive. In attempting to verbally recall features of an
object, our memory of other aspects is interfered with. The
verbal overlay tends to result in an over-emphasis of some
features and the simplification of others. Schooler speculates
that verbalization “breaks apart” the image in ways that are
difficult to later reassemble: “cognitive operations engaged in
during verbalization dampen the activation of brain regions
associated with critical non-verbal operations.”[25]
6. Hedonic Self-Appraisal
Estimations of our satisfactions are essential to the selfunderstanding of taste. Relying on methodological
triangulation, researchers can cross-check self-appraisals of
preferences and pleasures with behavior. When our appraisals
correspond with our behavior, researchers have reason to
trust their reliability and grant them authority. If we report
liking something and move on to buy it or use it in a way that
optimizes satisfaction, our report may be considered reliable.
Here, it is the combination of activities that matters. Hedonic
self-appraisals become doubtful when they do not correlate
with behavior.
Schooler finds that appraisals are “often closely calibrated with
external events, related behaviours, and physiological
responses.”[26] However, when subjects are asked to reflect

on experience, reliability decreases. In an experiment
involving assessments of jam, Wilson and Schooler compared
preferences, asking one group for an explanation for their
preference.[27] Preferences for both groups matched the
preferences of experts. But, when asked for reasons for their
preferences, the explainers changed their preferences with
greater frequency. Their new preferences diverged further
from expert opinion than their initial responses. In a study
with still greater resemblance to a conventional aesthetic
situation, subjects were exposed to art posters and asked for
preferences, again having one group also provide reasons for
their preferences. Subjects were allowed to select and take
home the poster that they preferred.[28] Individuals who
were asked for reasons for preferences were less likely later to
hang their poster on their walls at home than those who were
not asked to analyze their feelings. The findings suggest that,
when asked for reasons, our reports of our preferences are
more likely to vacillate, depart from expert opinion, and be
abandoned later. In all, preferences accompanied by reasons
are less likely to be authentic. We choose our jam, wine, or
poster in accordance with one train of thought; then, with
another, we eat, drink, and decorate.
Similar findings run throughout the literature on repression,
where subjects regularly adhere to self-ascriptions running
counter to observable behavior.[29] These studies identify
“top-down influences,” among them conceptual or normative
frameworks that limit our capacity to acknowledge our real
responses. Top-down influences define our experience
independently of what experimental observers take as our real
responses. Taste is especially vulnerable to top-down
influence.
Now, these studies may strike some readers as too simplistic
to warrant application to our engagement with art. Works of
art, it may be argued, give rise to far more complex responses
than do jams or even wines. It might even be argued that
viewing fine art posters in an experimental setting has little to
with our real encounters with fine art. Yet assuming the
greater complexity of real life aesthetic situations scarcely
allows us to increase confidence in our responses. Real works
of art introduce complex art historical, cultural, intentional,
and interpretive contexts, requiring us to appraise our
responses under a variety of rubrics. The difficulties of
hedonic appraisal only increase in real life aesthetic situations.
7. Reasons for Preferences
Deliberation and discourse do not in fact generate more
reliable self-appraisals. The phenomena of peak/end effect,
verbal overshadowing, and hedonic misappraisal suggest that
in situations where aesthetic experience is accompanied by
debate and discussion, the reliability of our knowledge of the
experience decreases, calling into question the very discourse
that is generated by the work of art. For this reason, critical
discourse may be less reliable as a guide to our experience
than we have supposed.
These findings run counter to some of the most fundamental
convictions of aestheticians and other arts professionals.
Through contemplation, deliberation, and discourse, we are
expected to discern what in a given object causes our

response. In aesthetics no less than other philosophical
disciplines, we honor the roles played by contemplation,
reflection, and debate in our assessments. Opinions are
considered stronger for having survived scrutiny. Revision is a
healthy component of the search for truth. Criticism is
thought to enhance our experience of art. Judgments are held
to be authoritative to the extent that they are the product of
deliberation.
Artists make things that inspire feelings of beauty or
satisfaction. Appreciating art is thought to require not just
liking the right things; it is to know—or at least, attempt to
know—what makes them right. When I ask myself why I like
the Cézanne or why I find the Cézanne beautiful, I am not
asking for an argument. I am asking for an explanation for a
mental state, an aesthetic experience. In principle, it is the
work, not the reason, that causes the experience. I do not like
Cézanne because his use of color happens to be a good reason
for liking a painting. Rather, Cézanne’s use of color explains
why I like his paintings, that is, why I have the feeling of
pleasure or satisfaction when I look at the Cézanne.
But, is this something I can know with reliability? The theory
of taste is faced with the daunting task of explaining why
commonplace expressions like “I like Cézanne because of his
use of color” or “Cézanne’s Madame Cézanne in a Red
Armchair is beautiful because of the color” can be reliable
statements. Now, the statement, “I like Madame Cézanne in a
Red Armchair because of the blue armchair” is obviously false.
Yet, an accurate color ascription to the armchair does not
necessarily make the statement true. It is possible that I
appeal to a prominent feature of the object such as the red
armchair only because of its prominence. But do I know that
this feature of the object is also the cause of my pleasure?
Consider the art historical theory about Cézanne, namely, that
his special place in our pantheon rests on his innovative use of
color. I am acquainted with this theory and speculate that the
use of color must have a certain aesthetic force, a certain
impact on a viewer like me. It is possible that, from this
theory and not from any aesthetic rumination, I infer that my
satisfaction with the Cézanne stems from his use of color. In
this light, art history and art theory are nothing more than
very specialized kinds of folk psychology. What makes these
folk psychologies persuasive? We lack any significant empirical
ground for judging the adequacy of these theories for aesthetic
experience. To the extent that they are sound, mastery of
them is far from widespread. In all, it is far more difficult to
attribute my satisfaction with the Cézanne to the red armchair
than our traditions of criticism and education let on.
Rumination produces its own discoveries.[30] Those
discoveries are not necessarily descriptive of mental states.
When asked for reasons, we are more likely to change our
mind than when unasked. Often, reasons themselves have
their more or less appealing qualities. We sometimes shift
about in our preferences as we seek those that best match the
most attractive reasons. Higher order deliberations are
especially vulnerable to distortion of the weights given to
competing reasons.[31] As advertisers have long known, the
search for status through taste can be helped along by
distinctive albeit arbitrary reasons.[32] Nor must we be

motivated by social climbing when we misattribute our
experience. Given the difficulties of self-attribution, especially
the distracting role of what Nisbett and Wilson call
“noninfluential stimuli,” whatever comes to mind when we look
for reasons has a chance to serve as a reason.[33] As Krista
Lawlor writes, “a thought that comes to mind in the course of
what one understands to be a search for reasons is taken to
be a reason, simply because it occurs in the context of a
search for reasons.”[34] In these ways, the search for reasons
distorts our understanding of our prior experience. The more
complicated the reason-giving process, the more likely it is to
generate confusion and error.
8. Reason-Shopping and the Art Worlds
If aesthetic experience is in fact unreliable, then it is not
surprising that descriptions can be easily mistaken, confused,
and replaced. Reason-shopping may account for some part of
the intellectualism in the more avant-gard corners of the art
world, such as art schools, niche publications, and alternative
venues. The pretentiousness of some of the art encountered
in these milieus may be due to an overemphasis on the critical
activity that accompanies and frames the work. Much
contemporary creativity, at least in its most avant-garde
manifestations, is no more than a search for interesting
reasons. For, reasons have their own beauty, which is easily
confused with the works themselves. At times, what art world
insiders are unwittingly experiencing are the reasons rather
than the works themselves. If only to impart to their vetting
process a sense of rigor and purpose, insiders are more likely
than casual art-goers to form their taste around the reasons
rather than the works themselves. With reason-consumption
replacing genuine aesthetic experience, insiders end up with
conceptually exotic but experientially thin works of art. When
outsiders later encounter the very same work of art and are
dumbfounded by its extreme austerity or perversity, what they
miss is that admirers are not so much consuming this
austerity or perversity as the reasons that are attached to it.
It is at this point that a misguided “art education” enters to
feed reasons to the outsiders, consolidating the negative
feedback loop which is today’s contemporary art world.
9. Implications for Art Institutions
Nearly all of modern art education presses upon us the crucial
difference between merely liking great artists and knowing
what makes these artists great, that is, what makes them
have their effect on us. Certain habits of discourse—reviews,
theory, crit sessions, docent tours, and now blogging—are
thought to offer us special opportunities to have deeper
experiences and, by implication, better taste. Art historians,
critics, curators, and the artists themselves are eager to
provide us with reasons for our experience. Entire institutions
—museums, schools, publications—are built upon the
production of reasons.
However, empirical research on self-appraisal suggests that
the institutions and the discursive habits they favor may not
really support the growth and refinement of aesthetic
experience or at least not in the ways we think. Our cultural
institutions may be simply the reification of our illusions about
attribution, working more in the manner of a placebo effect

than as efficacious practice. By encouraging us to pay some
kind of attention, criticism and education accidentally lead us
often enough to pay a rewarding kind of attention.
If introspection is unreliable, accounts of the effects that works
of art have on us may be less useful than ordinarily assumed.
Admittedly, this is a far-reaching conclusion, but it may
capture something of what is wrong with today’s art
institutions. Speculatively, a certain widely observed cultural
demoralization, a stand-off between the so-called philistines
and snobs, may be exacerbated more by the discursive habits
of insiders than by the stubborn ignorance of outsiders.
10. Next Steps for Aesthetics
Reading in philosophical aesthetics, one is left with the
impression that our aesthetic lives are made up of tranquil
satisfactions, with the occasional avant-garde head-scratcher
thrown in for good measure. We contemplate, reflect, and
debate the aesthetic qualities of works of art, aided by wellordered art institutions and insightful art critics. And, happily,
our taste, good or bad, is thus formed. From academic
aesthetics, one would not be able to glean that our aesthetic
experience may at times be marked by boredom, ambivalence,
and confusion. On closer inspection, we do not have the kind
of aesthetic life long assumed by philosophers. Taste is far
more anarchic, protean, ambivalent, underdetermined, and
confused than philosophers have allowed. It is marked by
pretending, exaggerating, vacillating, conforming, wishful
thinking, and pure invention. We often lack coherence among
judgments and continuity between what we experience and
what we take as our taste. Often, it is more like Cohen’s
“concatenation of atomistic expressions.” Subjects have a
contingent relationship to their self-appraisals, including those
involving aesthetic experience. Yet the theory of taste has
little to say about this side of our aesthetic lives. It is as if the
concept of virtue had developed in moral theory without any
consideration of vice, or truth in epistemology without any
conception of bias.
If this view of aesthetic experience is correct, what are its
implications for the theory of taste? A better theory of taste
may concede that our taste is probably far more disconnected
from our real moment-to-moment aesthetic experience than
we have assumed. To the extent that aesthetic deliberation is
successful, our attributions may be chalked up to a variety of
behavioral and cognitive processes, in addition to or instead of
the contemplating, beholding, or attending emphasized by
conventional models of aesthetic experience. For instance,
blind trial-and-error, unconscious incubation, and inference
from bodily sensation may play influential roles. Inferences
from theory (both folk and academic theory) probably play a
considerable role in attribution, leaving us heavily reliant on
the quality of these theories, which is not a promising
prospect.
In order to understand taste, we need to see that it plays a
restrictive role in our aesthetic lives rather than just an
enabling one. Often taste is commissive; we adjust our selfappraisals in order to fit our taste, inhibiting our capacity to
grasp what McGeer calls our “emotional and cognitive
situation.”[35] A commissive notion of taste explains how

taste may be thought of as authoritative, even when it is “topdown” and disconnected from experience. Over time, our
accounts of our experience end up as “true” because we make
those attributions work in the ongoing elaboration of our
taste. We create for ourselves the experiences which live up
to the taste we want to have. In tailoring our responses to
our taste, we engage in a form of self-creation through
taste.[36] Yet there are surely limits to the docility of
experience before taste. After all, our aesthetic lives are built
around experience. Without experience, it would be difficult to
imagine what an aesthetic life would be.[37]
Whereas we can imagine a purely moral or cognitive being
lacking experience, we can not imagine such an aesthetic
being. The aesthetic self has a fundamentally different
relationship to experience. It remains to be seen just where
the point of equilibrium between commissive taste and mindful
experience rests. Wherever it is, we can call this point wellformed taste. Well-formed taste pertains to the basis of taste
in experience, the extent to which and ways in which taste
must be based in aesthetic experience: entirely or not at all or
somewhere in between.
The job for aestheticians is to determine what counts as wellformed taste under the more complicated description of
aesthetic experience advanced here. How do we distinguish
authentic and inauthentic aesthetic judgment? Can my taste
be well-formed when it runs counter to my experience? How
much or what kind of variance is permitted? How does taste
really happen? What is aesthetic life really like?
With these questions, aesthetics has never been more valuable
to the various art worlds. However, the role for aestheticians
may lie less in lending philosophical weight to the questions of
particular disciplines than in bringing to these disciplines a
genuine knowledge of what is known about how human beings
respond to works of art. To play that role, aestheticians will
have to return to the basic questions of aesthetics.
Kevin Melchionne
Kevin@kevinmelchionne.com
Kevin Melchionne is a painter who writes about art.
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